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Abstract: 
We analyse the various conceptual notions that go under the umbrella “relationalism/substantivalism”. Our 
focus will be on evaluating the ontological status of spacetime in General Relativity (GR). To this end we 
systematically develop the ontological framework that implicitly underlies the traditional debate and common 
understanding of (classical) physics. We submit that spacetime with its chronogeometric and inertial structure, 
represented by the triple of the bare manifold, the metric and the affine structure, is best construed as the 
totality of possible and actual spatiotemporal relations of events. This can explain the non-fundamentality of 
general relativistic gravitational energy and suggests a non-causal, non-interactional understanding of the 
interdependence of matter in spacetime in GR. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper addresses the issue of whether spacetime is a substance or a relation, i.e. 
whether it exists independently of, “over and above” material things, as the stage on which 
the drama of the world unfolds1, the thought being that only a substance can exist 
independently. More precisely our agenda is twofold2: 
1. To offer some semantic clarifications, esp. w.r.t. the content of GR, i.e. outline an 
interpretation of the basic elements employed in the formalism of GR3: What do the 
various symbols of the formalism represent? 
2. To propose an ontological underpinning of GR, and gravitational wave theory, in 
particular w.r.t. category/status of spacetime: What is the ontological 
status/category of those entities represented in the GR formalism? 
We shall argue that spacetime, represented by (ℳ,    , ∇), the manifold together with its 
metric and (metrically compatible) affine structure, is best construed not as a substance, but 
                                                          
1 
For reviews, we refer to Dasgupta (2015), who focuses on the issue in classical mechanics, Huggett/Hoefer 
(2015), who are historically oriented. Comprehensive, systematic reviews are Earman (1989) and more 
recently, Pooley (2013). 
2
 We’ll specify our slightly idiosyncratic use of the terms shortly. 
3
 We’ll restrict ourselves to interpreting the standard formalism prevalent in the (textbook and non-
mathematical-physics) literature, to which thus it is tailored. The interpretation of a more modern formalism, 
starting from the fibre bundle G, with total space E and structure group G, and then defining the manifold as 
  =  / , cf. Socovosky (2011), may lend itself to a different ontology. 
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as the totality of possible and actual spatiotemporal relations between events; ontologically 
thus it is secondary  vis-à-vis matter (in a sense to be made precise below).  
 “To resist the suspicion that this corner of the debate is becoming merely terminological”4, 
we reassure the reader that the relational/substantival nature of spacetime has a direct 
implication for strategies of how to tackle a quantum theory of gravity5 - a topic we take up 
elsewhere6. 
Here, we shall proceed as follows: In section II, we shall explain in what respects the debate 
so far has remained unsatisfactory –mostly due to terminological imprecisions about 
(ontological) categories. In section III we therefore compile the conceptual paraphernalia we 
need for a semantic and ontological analysis, and which we shall put to work in section IV, 
highlighting the Action-Reaction Principle, the construal of Wheeler’s characterisation of the 
Einstein Equations as encoding interaction between matter and spacetime and the status of 
vacuum spacetimes. We shall devote special attention to the nature of the effects of 
gravitational waves and the extent to which our ontological analysis explains the non-
fundamentality of gravitational energy in GR. We close (section V) with a comparison of the 
brand of “liberalized” relationalism we try to defend with more traditional forms. 
 
2. The relationalism/substantivalism debate and its discontents  
Before embarking upon both a semantic and ontological analysis, a terminological 
clarification7 is in order. By “semantics” we mean the interpretation of all theoretical terms, 
i.e. assigning meaning to the formalism (“What do the symbols of the formalism refer to or 
represent?”); by “ontology” we mean a theory about the most general structures of reality, 
which explicates what all scientific theories (usually concerned with very specific 
hypotheses, e.g. the effects of impurities on the band structure of a specific solid) tacitly 
presuppose - or rather: take it for granted that these concepts are “intuitively clear”. Such 
core concepts are, i.a., “thing”, “time” or “space”. The ontologist thus intends to rationally 
(re-)construct a conceptual system (“ontology”) that captures what reality (“ontics”) is 
fundamentally made of. Reality is, of course, a given; things, their properties and mutual 
relations cannot be severed in re (“ontically”). As we shall see more clearly presently, rather 
than around “spacetime realism”, i.e. the question of whether spatiotemporal relations 
exist, the relationalism debate revolves around the question concerning what the status or 
category of “spacetime” is in the logico-conceptual hierarchy of the ontology: In which 
category (e.g. a substance or a relation) does spacetime belong? How is this category 
                                                          
4
 Pooley (2013), p. 63. 
5
 As suggested, for instance, by Stachel (2014), Sect. 6.4 and Smolin (2005) 
6
 Duerr/Lehmkuhl (2015c) 
7
 To avoid misunderstandings: We do not follow the Quinean usage of “ontology” (as opposed to “ideology”), 
cf. Pooley (2012), p. 26; instead, we follow Bunge’s usage, (1967) and (1977), for it captures in our opinion 
more clearly the questions at issue here (and furthermore is more continuous with common parlance in 
analytic ontology).  
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characterized? Which concepts does it presuppose? (Think of the analogous case in 
mathematics: The definition of an algebra presupposes that of a vector space.) What is the 
status of certain propositions that involve spacetime and its characteristics: Are they 
theorems that follow from a given set of axioms? The majority of philosophers of physics 
(wont to feel more at ease at analyzing scientific theories) are reluctant to construct a 
systematic, axiomatic ontology, which starts from certain primitive concepts, axioms and 
postulates8. Such an explicit construction of an ontology is called for, firstly, because no 
ontology can be readily read off the formalism (to be sure: neither can it be based on a priori 
navel-contemplation)9; secondly, without such a systematically developed ontology it seems 
unlikely be possible to assess unambiguously the ontological status of space and time –a 
question one might be interested in for several reasons. Analogously again, the very idea of 
assessing the status of, say, Euclid’s Theorem -provable theorem? Postulated axiom?- makes 
no sense without any at least rudimentarily elaborated arithmetic. 
With this in mind, let’s articulate our dissatisfaction about the extent literature on the 
relationalism debate: 
1. Firstly, five distinct concepts go under the umbrella of 
relationalism/substantivalism. At worst, terminological carelessness in this regard 
renders it difficult to fathom the respective authors’ aim and whether they have 
actually achieved it10:  
a) “Realism about spacetime”: Are certain structures in the mathematical 
formalism that are (for certain reasons) associated with “spacetime” 
indispensable or at least explanatorily potent, and should therefore we take 
the formalism seriously and regard these structures as representing 
something real? This spacetime realism is a speial case of scientific realism; it 
is neutral on whether spacetime is a substance, a relation or whatnot. 
However, if a theory that has been convincingly equipped with an ontology 
and interpretation, turns out to be empirically successful, scientific realism 
encourages us to take seriously this whole “web of beliefs”, including its 
specific ontological framework.   
 
                                                          
8
 A highly formalised axiomatised ontology is found in Bunge (1977) and, in the same tradition, an “exact 
philosophy of spacetime“ in Vucetich (2011). 
9
 Cf. Esfeld (2013) 
10
 To give three examples of such careless terminology that invites misunderstanding:  
 Baker, for instance, writes “A relationalist […] (holds) that all spatial and temporal properties are 
reducible to properties of material objects”, Baker (2013), p. 1.  
 Or, an even more misleading characterization of relationalism is given by Skow, viz. as “the doctrine 
that space and time do not exist” (Skow (2007), p. 1). Few relationalists, however, would subscribe to 
a Berkeleyian/ Borgesian view of spacetime as an illusion! 
 Historically, “Mach himself never seems to have kept [Machian and Leibnizian relationalism] apart.”, 
Huggett/Hoefer (2015), sect. 8.1. 
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b) “Leibnizean relationalism”11: This is the ontological claim that spacetime is the 
totality of relations, and not itself a substance – a dichotomy that usually 
presupposes a certain type of ontology, a s.c. substance ontology. However, 
alternatives to substance ontologies have been proposed in which events or 
properties and relations are primary and exist independently, constituting e.g. 
ordinary stuff as bundles of properties or relations. We will elaborate on this 
in the next section. 
 
c) Spacetime subsistentialism: By that we mean the likewise ontological claim 
that spacetime can ontically subsist, i.e. whether -irrespective of the 
ontological category, e.g. substance or relation- it can exist independently of 
matter: Which is ontologically more fundamental, matter or spacetime, or are 
both on the same footing? In a substance ontology, things are the only 
entities that carry properties and exist independently12; consequently the 
conjunction of substance ontology and Leibnizean relationalism imply the 
negation of spacetime subsistentialism.  Given the alternatives to substance 
ontologies, one could be both a Leibnizean relationalist and a spacetime 
subsistentialist simultaneously, though – a view that (ontic) structural realists 
supersubstantivalists leanings might find appealing.  
A particularly virulent question13 in the relationalism debate concerns the 
status of vacuum solutions: Do they exist or are they, as Einstein initially 
thought, merely formal solutions? – A question for the spacetime 
subsistentialist. 
 
d) “Machian relationalism” aims at finding an explanation for the physical 
distinction of a class of reference frames identified as inertial frames. The 
Machian relationalist hopes to find it in a physical theory that only uses 
relative distances between material bodies and their derivatives as the 
fundamental spacetime-theoretical variables.  Machian relationalism, with 
Barbour’s Shape Dynamics14 as its prime contemporary exponent, thus is a 
(non-mainstream) research programme in search of a theory to supersede 
GR; it therefore lies outside our present purpose of analyzing GR.   
 
                                                          
11
 Friedman (1983), Ch. VI, coined the terms “Leibnizean” and “Machian relationalism”, drawing attention to 
their distinctness. Huggett/Hoefer (2015) take up this distinction, but call it instead “Mach-lite” and “Mach-
heavy”, respectively. 
12
 Sklar, who introduced the relationalism/substantivalism terminology, seems to implicitly presuppose such a 
substance ontology (which defines substances essentially by being carriers of properties and by subsistence, cf. 
Kuhlmann (2013), Ch. 7.3) when he characterizes substantivalism as the view that spacetime “can be said to 
exist and to have specified features independently of the existence of ordinary material objects” (Sklar (1974), 
p. 161. 
13
 Cf. Earman (1989), Ch. 1.6 
14
 Cf. Pooley (2013), Ch. 6.2 
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e) Eliminability/reducibility of spacetime structure: Our distinction bifurcates 
once more into “scientific reduction” and “ontological reduction”:   
a. Whether a given property or a relation are reducible to other degrees 
of freedom, is a purely scientific question - once the philosophers have 
made more precise what is supposed to be meant by “reduction”15. 
(To avoid ambiguity, we merely add the rider “scientific”.) We submit 
that solely by itself general-relativistic spacetime relations do not 
supervene on other degrees of freedom of matter. To see this, let us 
recall that a relation R supervenes on a property P, iff (i) each relatum 
of R instantiates P and (ii) the instantiations of P uniquely determine 
R16. Neither condition seems to be satisfied:   
 Firstly, recall17 that Einstein Equations are a set of partial differential 
equations with a source density     =
 
 | |
 
    
  | |ℒ , which itself 
contains not only the metric    , but also the matter Lagrangian ℒ. 
Apart from a mild constraint on the functional dependence of ℒ that 
implements the (Einstein) Equivalence Principle (and thus ensures the 
validity of the Bianchi identities ∇   R   −
 
 
Rg    = 0), GR does not 
specify the matter theory; in that sense it is not a fundamental 
theory18: The matter theory must be inserted by hand. Consequently, 
GR just by itself offers no matter properties P to begin with on which 
the spatiotemporal relations could potentially supervene. 
Suppose, though, we fortuitously stumbled on a model of matter on 
whose properties spatiotemporal relations would indeed supervene. It 
seems highly implausible that any (classical19) matter model would do 
the trick, so as to capture also the spatiotemporal effects elicited in 
that matter model! Conversely, it seems safe to assume that at least 
one (realistic) matter model exists on which spatiotemporal relations 
do not supervene. 
 Secondly,     does not contain all degrees of freedom. At best
20, it 
encodes the energy-momentum of matter: That need not exhaust all 
there is to matter, though. In other words, the Einstein Equations are 
                                                          
15
 A task the conceptual complexity of which should not underestimated, cf. Vanriel/Gulick (2014) for a review. 
16
 Cf. Cleland (1985) 
17
 Cf. Duerr/Lehmkuhl (2015b) for details 
18
 Hoefer (2009), Sect. 4.2 also points this out. 
19
 This rider is necessary, for a unified quantum description of matter evades the objections offered above. 
Such unified quantum descriptions of matter have been investigated recently, cf., e.g. Hedrich (2012) for a brief 
review.  In fact, in Duerr/Lehmkuhl (2015d) we explicitly advocate such an emergent spacetime framework as 
an attractive possible approach to quantum gravity compatible with our results Duerr/Lehmkuhl (2015a,b,c). 
20
  In fact, we argue that it does not even represent energy-momentum proper, cf. Duerr/Lehmkuhl (2015b). 
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insensitive to matter degrees of freedom other than energy-
momentum21.     
b. Now to the notion of ontological reduction; it is a nonstarter: 
Relations in general form an ontologically irreducible or fundamental 
category (represented by all predicates other than unary ones), 
independently of whether certain relations are indeed scientifically 
reducible or not. This is reflected in the second condition for 
supervenience: The category of a relation is presupposed their as 
primitive. 
In short: We shall not concern ourselves with Machian relationalism – a research agenda for 
an alternative to GR – and reject the idea of eliminating spacetime; instead, adopting 
scientific realism throughout, we shall examine whether a spacetime subsistentialist, Leibniz-
relational ontology is defensible22. 
This leads us to a second complaint about the literature: 
2. Namely the tendency not to properly define the ontological categories employed, 
first and foremost what exactly one means by the concept of substance/thing23. The 
respective texts restrict themselves to vague, metaphoric paraphrases (such as the 
examples we gave), obfuscating the debate with cryptic talk about spacetime being a 
“maybe pseudo-substantial thing”24: Recall that ψευδής means “false” or “lying”; 
consequently, such a substantivalist position would bizarrely be one where 
spacetime is not a substance after all! An even more misleading claim is that a 
substantivalist is a realist about spacetime: Whatever brand of realism one may 
                                                          
21
 This blocks a standard argument against supervenience, invoking the fact that for the same matter energy-
momentum, e.g. vacuum, the Einstein Equations can simultaneously yield different spacetimes, e.g. 
gravitational waves and Minkowski space. 
22
 Benovsky (2010) has drawn attention to an interesting point concerning the structural equivalence of 
substantivalism and relationalism. In light of such structural equivalence he offers as one option (his “strong 
claim”, p. 500) to regard the difference between the two as merely terminological. We take a more 
conservative stance (Benovsky’s “weak claim”): Such an equivalence of two metaphysical positions only 
indicates similarities in their structure, i.e. the role certain of its elements play in the whole conceptual system 
at issue; the equivalence does not extend to the nature of the two systems. Such a structural equivalence of 
two theories that describe unconnected, vastly different phenomena are common in science, e.g. the 
equations of the Black Scholes option pricing model in essence take the form of the heat equation, while the 
change of temperature in a body is in no way related to the behaviour of financial markets. 
23
 Teller, for instance, diagnoses: “[…] (N)either I nor, as far as I know, anyone else has offered a close analysis 
of what ‘substantival’ comes to in this discussion.”, Teller (1991), p. 383. Earman’s often quoted usage of 
“substance” in the sense that bodies and space-time points or regions are elements of the domains of the 
intended models of [space-time theories] of the physical world”, Earman (1989), p. 114, somewhat circumvents 
the ontological problem. Although a powerful tool in other context, such as the issue of Background 
Independence, cf. Pooley (2015), the model-theoretic perspective is futile, when it comes to ontological 
questions, since it contains no ontological information whatsoever; it only deals with the mathematical 
representation of certain aspects of the target system. This becomes especially clear in its failure to connect to 
traditional themes of the (non-Machian) relationalism/substantivalism debate: For instance, the argument of 
vacuum solutions ceases to be cogently pro-substantivalist, if one precludes vacuum solutions from the notion 
of intended GR models.     
24
 Huggett/Hoefer (2015), sect. 5.2.  
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advocate, for most human beings - amongst them also the majority of professing 
substantivalists – relations to their friends or their dog are eminently real. If our best 
scientific theories happen to contain terms that describe relations, nothing stymies a 
realist interpretation of them! (Evidently, there is no reason for such a realist to reify 
relations.) Even the more scrupulous accounts suffer from this ambiguity: Lehmkuhl, 
for instance, in his characterization of the substantivalist’s core commitment, defines 
a substance as “a basic (or fundamental) object that is not derivative of anything 
else”25 – a definition that leaves only postpones the crucial points: a) what counts as 
an object (would a process be one or a property?) and b) what precisely is meant as 
“derivable” or fundamental26? Obscurum per obscurius. - As we saw, ontologically all 
relations are irreducible/primitive/fundamental (and whether all relations are 
scientifically reducible is a bold claim!) – as Lehmkuhl himself argued elsewhere 
himself27. In short, our promising definition winds up as one that blurs the ontological 
difference between substance/thing and relations, rendering it prima facie of 
doubtful value in a debate about the substantival or relational status of spacetime! 
Within analytic metaphysics key concepts such as “substance” or “process” have a clearly 
delineated meaning28. If we strive for a lucid and profound ontological analysis, we’d   better 
learn from our metaphysics colleagues! Let’s therefore start now with some basic 
ontological terminology.  
 
3. Ontological framework  
Following the Aristotelian-Kantian tradition, we shall adopt an explicitly thing-based or 
substance ontology29,30, i.e. one that takes the class of things (substances) as the 
ontologically prior category (a more detailed specification will be given presently). The 
reasons for this choice are threefold: 
- A substance ontology sticks close to our commonsense intuitions, roughly reflecting 
the background metaphysics most people (including physicists) primarily operate 
with31. Pragmatically, thus, it is a natural starting point. 
                                                          
25
 Lehmkuhl (2015), p. 5.  
26
 To be fair, in sect. 4 Lehmkuhl, loc. cit., elucidates the concepts of reduction (and emergence) in the context 
of super-substantivalism (whose core commitment consists in the tenet that “spacetime is the only (kind of) 
substance”, loc. cit., p. 6).  
27
 Cf. Lehmkuhl (2010), esp. sect. 6.  
28
 Cf. Robinson (2014) 
29
 Cf. Kuhlmann (2013), Ch. 7.3. Ch. 7 gives a brief contemporary introduction to analytic ontology in the 
context of modern (quantum) physics. 
30
 We liberally draw on Mittelstaedt (1981) and Bunge (1977). The former emphasizes the Kantian notion of 
substance, showing its fertility for contemporary discourse. Bunge tailors his terminology to his original, 
formalised substance ontology. 
31
 A substance ontology may be regarded as an instance of what Strawson calls “descriptive metaphysics”, cf. 
Kuhlmann (2013), Ch. 7.1. 
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- Most combatants in the relationalism/substantivalism debate seem to have 
presupposed a substance ontology themselves – albeit only implicitly32.  
- On a more systematical level, a substance ontology turns out to be a natural 
framework for classical physics, i.e. one close to taking the standard formalism of 
classical theories at face value: As Scheibe has argued, it is “the modern concept of a 
physical system which comes nearest to the traditional notion of substance”33; he 
characterizes the latter by independent existence, monadic predication, individuality 
and completeness. (More on these s.c. ontological category features below.)  
In other words: A “classical ontology” (Mittelstaedt) helps elucidating the conceptual 
structure of (classical) physics – thus doing exactly what a (classical) ontology should 
do. 
Now to the eponym of our type of ontology: We shall call an entity a substance or 
substratum (ὑποκείμενον) if it can be ascribed properties34 - it is predicable. (In the 
following, “object”, “thing”, “substance” or ”substratum” will be used interchangeably.) On 
top of being the carriers of properties, substances usually stand in relations to each other. 
Properties are represented by unary predicates, e.g.: “… is 2 feet tall”; relations by n-ary 
predicates (with   ∈ ℕ  ), e.g. “…is married to …”. It follows that properties do not have 
properties themselves35: Only their conceptualizations, i.e. the predicates that represent 
these properties do. (Such a distinction is crucial for ontological consistency: if properties 
had properties themselves, they would count as substances; consequently the ontological 
difference between properties and substances would collapse.) For instance, the momentum 
of an acoustic wave is not differentiable; only the functions that represent the density 
fluctuations and their associated momenta of the air are. Likewise the distinction between 
intrinsic and extrinsic properties is misleading: According to the received terminology a 
property, e.g. mass, is called intrinsic, if the property holds independently of what other 
object exist and which properties they possess; an extrinsic property of an object, e.g. 
weight, by contrast, is one that holds in virtue of its relation to other objects. Within our 
nominalist/substance-ontological framework, properties don’t exist simpliciter, though (only 
to the extent that there exist objects that possess them); hence, a fortiori there exist no 
distinction between intrinsic/extrinsic properties. Given that such a (generally useful) 
distinction by definition presupposes a relation, anyway, we propose the following way out 
to save it: Firstly the distinction holds only between predicates, i.e. the elements of our 
conceptual system we employ to represent properties; secondly, extrinsic predicates are 
only shorthand for or implicit ways of representing a relation (with a non-descript 
                                                          
32
 Cf. Sklar (1974), p. 161, for instance, whose characterization of substantivalism is manifestly embedded in a 
substance ontological framework. 
33
 Scheibe (1991), p. 215 
34 
Moreover, Kant’s formulations, which provide an impressive ontological underpinning of classical physics, 
can be understood as requiring that the predicate structure be Boolean, cf. Mittelstaedt (1981), Ch. 4.  
35
 Cf. Bunge (1977), Ch. 4, esp. section 4, where the issue of properties of properties is explicitly discussed, as 
well as some potential objections. 
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relatum/a).  For example, “Fritz is married.” is an implicit way of saying “There exists 
somebody to whom Fritz is married.”. In short, extrinsic predicates are relations in disguise.   
Opting for a thing-ontology, we now postulate that things/objects, endowed with their 
respective properties, make up the fundamental furniture of the world36,37: Things exist 
independently (subsist); properties or relations don’t. A property or relation is thus always a 
property or relation of something (in re): A universe is easily conceivable in which only a 
horse exist, “whereas a boundary could not even be imagined without something else whose 
boundary it is”38. Relations without relata don’t exist. In this sense what we mean 
ontologically, when we say that a relation has changed, it is really the relata that stand in 
new relations. Substances, properties and relations are each ontologically irreducible or 
fundamental: These categories are disjoint; one cannot “reduce” (whatever that may mean) 
a generic binary predicate to a unary one – irrespectively of the possibility of a scientific 
reduction.  
Let’s take a closer look at properties. Amongst all properties, we posit that one is special, 
namely mutability, i.e. the ability of an object to change its state39. In turn, we define the 
state of an object as the totality of its properties. Scientific laws (provided by the individual 
sciences) are restrictions of the state space of objects, i.e. the set of all logically possible 
properties, to certain subsets40 (representing nomological possibilities). Energy, we now 
stipulate, is a quantitative measure of mutability. (A motivation will be given below.) As such 
it is exactifies a meta-physical (rather than a merely physical) concept41, in this respect 
resembling probabilities as quantifications of propensities42 (with Kolmogorow’s Axioms as 
the formal desiderata a specific probability measure should satisfy). To propose specific 
quantifications of metaphysical concepts (such as propensities or mutability) assess their 
empirical adequacy, their interrelations or even prove their uniqueness is one of the jobs of 
the individual sciences43.  
Remark 1: Having no energy is not the same as having zero energy: The latter presupposes 
that it’s meaningful to assign the entity in question the respective quantity - albeit only with 
the quantification 0; whereas the former means that it isn’t. An elementary example would 
                                                          
36
 Cf. loc. cit., Ch. 3.4 
37
 Like all other theories, every ontology is only “hypothetical, tentative and fallible” (Popper); there are no a 
priori reasons to prefer one (type of) ontology over another, for instance, one based on substances over one 
based on processes. In particular, one cannot “read off” an ontology from the formalism; it must be 
constructed explicitly. Pluralism of ideas is called for here as on all other intellectual turfs! (Recall our remarks 
in footnote 3.) The value of a proposed ontology is always evaluated ex post: Does it elucidate (philosophically) 
certain theories? Does it help us solve certain problems? Is it heuristically (and/or didactically) fertile? How 
does it fare in comparison with other proposals? A list of meta-criteria of good ontologies/metaphysics is given 
in Ch. 8 and 9 of Vollmer (1993). 
38
 Kuhlmann (2013), p. 73 
39
 Cf. Bunge (1977), Ch. 5, (1981), Ch. I and (2000) 
40
 Cf. Bunge (1977), Ch. 3.2 
41
 Cf. also Bunge (2000).  
42
 Cf., for instance, Bunge (1977), Ch. 4 
43
 There is no guarantee, though, that the quantification is unique –arguably one of the lessons from the quest 
for the right probability or entropy measure in statistical mechanics, cf., for instance, Sklar (2015), Sect. 2-4. 
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be: “The determinant of ℚ is 0.”, which is nonsense, whereas “ℚ doesn’t have a 
determinant” is an impeccable, true statement.  
Remark 2: One must not be misled by ordinary expressions such as “The concept of marriage 
changed over the course of history”, which simply means that the same word was used for 
different concepts. 
How to motivate now the above identification of energy as a measure of the ontological 
superproperty of mutability? 
- Within a purely Lagrangian framework, it can be shown directly44: If we take the 
Lagrangian (or the action) to represent the network of relations that must hold 
between events (defined them as changes in the state of an entity, see next section) 
so as to be attribute them to one substance (or, put differently, so as to warrant dia- 
and synchronic identity of the underlying substratum), the canonical definition of 
energy as the Lie derivative of the Lagrangian along a time-like vector field literally 
evaluates the change of the Lagrangian it acts on along the flow of the time-like 
vector field. Note that the (arbitrarily chosen) time-like vector field here only serves 
the purpose of an ordering parameter amongst events. (We’ll elaborate the meaning 
of coordinates and the definition of a field in the next section.) 
- The most general universally accepted definition of energy one finds in the physics 
literature arguably boils down to “capacity to do work”, thus involving forces. The 
latter induce a change of locomotion (i.e. of the mechanical state), which via the  
convertibility (and conservation) of energy extends to non-mechanical states.  Note 
that this argument is independent from the previous one, since some classical 
scenarios (e.g. those involving electromagnetic radiation) do not admit of a classical 
Lagrangian formulation45. 
- By the same token, energy conservation together with a marker theory of causality –
causation as a lawlike relation of change between events with energy transfer – link 
change and energy.   
- Thinking of energy as a measure of mutability fulfills  two  functions by offering a 
unifying perspective46:  
o It accounts for the centrality and ubiquity of energy within one discipline. 
Here one predominantly studies how changes in one thing are related to 
changes in either the same or another thing. E.g.: How does the stability of a 
system change if you increase some of its parameters? 
o Likewise, it accounts for the centrality and ubiquity of energy across the 
various disciplines, where one predominantly studies how changes of things 
that belong to the domain of one discipline are related to changes in other 
                                                          
44
 Cf. Duerr (2015a) 
45
 Cf. Galley (2012) 
46
 Cf. Bunge (2000). The need and fertility for such a unifying perspective should not be underestimated, 
especially both for the didactic and methodological training of scientists and science teachers, cf. Coelho 
(2009).  
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things or systems that belong to a different (“higher” or “lower”) discipline. 
E.g.: How is an increase in the concentration of certain neurotransmitters 
(change on a biochemical level) related to the onset of a depression (change 
on a psychological level)?  
Remark: Substance conservation and energy conservation are not the same47:  
- The former is a fundamental ontological feature of substances, called “persistence”: 
Material objects don’t get created or destroyed out of the blue. Within all of 
classical/non-quantum physics, including GR, substances persist48. In a geometric 
spacetime setting, persistence translates into continuity of worldlines (or worldtubes 
for fields).  
- Conservation of energy ontologically means that the extent to which objects are able 
to undergo change itself does not change: Everything changes, except, as it were, 
changeability.  Conservation of energy does not generically hold49 in GR: It depends 
on the presence of certain spacetime symmetries. This translates into variability of 
mutability. 
As the reader will already anticipate, we are already squinting with one eye at exploiting this 
suggested connection between the non-existence of general-relativistic gravitational energy 
and relationalism. We shall return to this connection in detail in the next section. For the 
moment, let us collect the last items in our ontological toolkit. 
Are all substances automatically material substances? For an answer let us further partition 
all substances into two categories: Those whose state space is a point (i.e. those substances 
which cannot change) and those whose state space contains at least two elements (i.e. those 
substances which can change). We call the former material/matter (or concreta), and the 
latter immaterial substances, or concepts (or abstracta). All familiar things such as cats or 
classical fields count as material substances; whereas Quetzalcoatl, mathematical objects or 
the beauty of Oriel College count as concepts.  
Let us pause for a moment to justify this philosophically loaded (e.g. think of the medieval 
problem of universals!) terminology. We offer two arguments, both continuous with the 
main approaches to analytic metaphysics of abstracta50:  
                                                          
47 
Bunge (2000) doesn’t make this distinction – nor does he realise that energy conservation in general doesn’t 
hold in GR. Interestingly, Kant, on the other hand, seems to have kept a “quantum of substance”, which 
apparently corresponds to a conserved quantity associated with the homogeneity of time, and substance 
conservation conceptually distinct. Due to the (in his opinion necessarily) Euclidean nature of space and time 
imply each other, cf. Mittelstaedt (1981), p. 130, footnote 3. 
48
 Cf. loc. cit. and Kuhlmann (2013), Ch. 7.3. Quantum physics forces us to revise this aspect of the classical 
ontology: The law of conservation of substance no longer holds, cf. Mittelstaedt (1981), Ch. 2 and esp. 4, and 
Kuhlmann (2013), Ch. 7.4 and Appendix B2. It can be argued that modern particle physics, i.e. QFT, forces us to 
jettison the concept of substance altogether (in the sense that QFT entities cannot be understood neither as 
fields nor particles), cf. loc. cit. Ch. 8 and 9. A fortiori, conservation of substance would no longer hold either. 
49
 Cf. Hoefer (2000) or Duerr/Lehmkuhl (2015b)  
50
 Cf. Rosen (2012) 
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- Apart from the cardinality of their respective state space, all the various paradigmatic 
instances of concreta and abstracta seem to have nothing in common; the cardinality 
of their state space is their “greatest common ontological denominator”.  
- This ties in well with two common demarcation criteria of concreta vs. abstracta51: 1. 
The first one invokes the causal inefficacy of abstracta. Causality is a relation 
between events, which takes the logical form of a sufficient condition: A change c in 
one thing implies a change e in another thing. Since according to our definition 
abstracta cannot change, it follows that they can neither causally act nor be acted 
upon. 2. The second criterion invokes the non- spatiality of abstracta. We shall argue 
in the next section that, there are no “irreducible, monadic spatiotemporal 
properties like ‘is located at…’”52; instead, spacetime is the totality of spatiotemporal 
relations between events. As abstracta do not change, there are no events in them 
that can stand in spatiotemporal relations to begin with. For any brand of 
relationalism the argument takes an even sharper form in favour of the 
conceptual/abstract status of spacetime (thus ensuring virtuous circularity): As the 
relationalist regards the latter as the totality of spatiotemporal relations, they 
constitute spatiality (or rather: spatiotemporality). Consequently, spatiotemporal 
relations cannot stand in spatiotemporal interrelations themselves. 
Back to our main line. Following the consensus amongst philosophers of science (barring 
perhaps those working in the philosophy of mind or mathematics), we adopt a materialist 
framework; we posit that only material substances really exist “out there”53 (ontically 
subsist): Only material substances enjoy an ontically independent existence, whereas 
concepts enjoy only an ontologically independent existence: A cat, which can turn grey or 
fat, exists out there, whereas the concept of a cat does not exist ante rem, that is: The 
concept (“token”) does not dwell, as a self-sustaining entity, in a Platonic realm of ideas.  
Note that we use concepts, i.e. the ontically non-real, (e.g. predicates) to represent the 
ontically real (e.g. properties); a conceptual substance (which by definition has properties) 
can thus represent a physical non-substance (such as a property), which by definition has 
none. We must keep this in mind, when trying to tailor an ontology we want to develop to 
the formalism, lest the conceptual substantiality of an object in the formalism decoy us into 
naively reifying what it represents. 
Using the results developed so far, we can re-phrase a key insight: A necessary criterion for 
an object to count as a material substance is to have energy54,55. What about a sufficient 
                                                          
51
 Cf. loc. cit., sect. 3.  
52
 Earman (1989), p. 13 
53
 Cf. Bunge (1981), Ch. I and V 
54
 Cf. loc. cit. and Lehmkuhl (2011). 
55
 Most authors who broach gravitational energy in the context of the substantivalism/relationalism debate 
likewise seem to (at least implicitly) cherish this view. For instance, for Earman and Norton the very categorical 
difference between substantival spacetime (“container”) and matter (“the content of spacetime”) hinges on 
energy: “If we do not classify such energy bearing structures [...] as contained within space-time, then we do 
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criterion then? We propose that possessing energy and satisfying certain energy conditions56 
as jointly sufficient and necessary for an entity to count as a material thing/substance57. 
Without going into further detail, let’s only cursorily make this plausible: Energy conditions 
encode certain formalized meta(-)physical assumptions for matter58: For instance, the 
dominant energy condition captures the notion that energy-mass can never be transported 
superluminally; “if one drops the energy condition altogether, it is possible to construct bits 
of matter that propagate along any timelike curve. […] And if one weakens the (dominant) 
energy condition […] one can construct bits of matter that propagate along spacelike or null 
curves respectively.”59 In this sense, energy conditions serve as ontological/metaphysical 
selection rules for matter models. 
For the benefit of the reader we list the ontological apparatus developed so far in the 
following table: 
term/entity/ontological category definition/ features 
Substance, object, thing predicability, ontological subsistence  
state (space)  (totality of) possible properties 
material substance, matter, concretum mutability (|state space| ≥ 2), ontic subsistence, 
persistence 
concept, conceptual substance, abstractum immutability, no ontic subsistence 
Energy measure for mutability 
event in material substance   ordered pair of changes in  : (state ( ), state ( ) 
the  World Θ Totality of all things: { :   is a material thing} 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
not see how we can consistently divide between container and contained”, Norton/Earman (1987), p. 519. By 
modus tollens, substantivalism (as the claim that spacetime is the substantival receptacle in which all events of 
the material world take place) thus implies that whatever has energy counts as a substance.  
56
 Cf. Poisson (2007), Ch. 2.1 or Malament (2012), Ch. 2.5 for an introduction. 
57
 Appealing to certain energy conditions might turn out to be a helpful tool to distinguish between physical 
and non-physical (“geometric”) fields in the context of alternative theories of gravity, esp. scalar-tensor 
theories, cf. Sotiriou et al. (2007). Generically, the Brans-Dicke scalar, which can be assigned an energy-
momentum tensor, violates any energy condition. Thus, according to the above criterion it does not qualify as a 
material/physical scalar, which exists ontologically on a par with other physically substantival things. 
Essentially, many of the arguments from our discussion of the classical GR case carry over: The Brans-Dicke 
scalar represents a relation. With hindsight this makes sense, since the scalar was historically introduced to 
render the gravitational coupling constant a dynamical variable (thereby incorporating Dirac’s Law of Large 
Numbers, cf. Weinberg (1972), Ch. 7.3); but without matter present gravity cannot couple to anything, so that 
the existence of the scalar (seen as the dynamically evolving strength of the gravitational coupling constant) 
(onto-)logically presupposes the existence of physical matter fields, and thus doesn’t represent an autonomous 
entity. We will tackle an ontological analysis of Brans-Dicke theory in a future project. 
58
 Cf. Curiel (2014c) for a comprehensive review. Note that the empirical discovery of fields that violate certain 
energy conditions may force us to revise the concomitant metaphysical assumptions (for instance about 
superluminally propagating causal mechanisms). Physicists already use energy conditions to ontologically 
categorise the fields in terms of substantival (physical) and non-substantival (geometrical), e.g., in the context 
of gravitational theories, cf. Sotiriou et al. (2007). 
59
 Weatherall (2012), p. 20 (his emphasis) 
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We now hold in our hands the conceptual tools to get our semantic and ontological analysis 
to work. Methodically, note that an interpretation must be posited explicitly (via what Bunge 
aptly calls “semantic axioms”60). 
 
4. Semantics and ontology of GR 
Given a geometric spacetime theory (neo-Newtonian, neo-Minkowskian or general-
relativistic), let’s scrutinise now one of the main protagonists, the bare manifold ℳ itself. 
Scientific realism demands “semantic completeness”: In order to promote the mathematical 
formalism to an empirical theory each indispensable, non-mathematical/formal symbol must 
be assigned an unambiguous meaning61: What then does a point of the manifold represent? 
Since the representing mathematical entity should ideally somehow reflect the features of 
the real entity it represents, notice first that a point in a set lacks any intrinsic for 
properties62: Not even dimensionality or topology are available; they are properties of the 
manifold set to which the points belong! Accordingly, what a point represents had better not 
be a thing (which by definition would have to be predicable). Instead, the candidate that 
lends itself naturally for the office, is an event, defined as a change of the state of a thing  , 
i.e. an (ordered) pair of its states, < state1( ), state2( )>. (It follows that an event is not a 
thing!) Multiply occurring events are represented by different manifold points. Identifying 
manifold points with events is in line with common practice in Special Relativity, where a 
correct understanding of length contraction and time dilation calls for the identification of 
the proper events of the respective situation: It’s easy to conceive of experimental setups, 
such as in the Barn-Ladder-Paradox, where the measured time is contracted, whereas the 
measured length is dilated63.   
The chart (coordinate system), which maps manifold points ℳ to ℝ , provides a mere 
labeling catalogue of events,  – in and of itself boring book-keeping that, figuratively 
speaking, only specifies the format of the label (via the dimensionality) and the section of 
the archive in which to retrieve a file of a given label (via the topology). What ultimately we 
are interested in though, is the real order “hidden underneath the conventional labeling 
tags”, the objective (invariant) relations between events - the real spatiotemporal 
structures: Spatiotemporal statements such as “The proper length of a between two events, 
                                                          
60
 Cf. Bunge (1967) Ch. 1 and (1981), Ch. 10. 
61
 Cf. Bunge (1967), Ch. 1 
62
 Our view thus opposes e.g. Stachel’s (2014). He takes the lesson from the hole argument to be that “the 
points of spacetime have quiddity [i.e. share the same intrinsic properties], but no inherent haecceity [i.e. 
properties that individuate things of the same quiddity]”, p. 39. According to our thing-based ontology, only 
things possess intrinsic properties; non-things, such as processes or events, have no properties at all. Stachel’s 
position seems to imply the existence of non-intrinsic, i.e. extrinsic properties, and hence relations that 
individuate otherwise indistinguishable entities. Relations one might, however, argue ontologically presuppose 
distinct relata, so that no longer it is clear how the distinctness of spacetime points can be reconciled with the 
absence of any individuating properties. 
 
63
 Cf. van der Weele/Snoijer (2005) 
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A and B, in a particle with the affinely-parameterised curve   ( ) is ℓ: ∫   
 
 
 |    ̇  ̇ | =
ℓ.” can thus be understood  relationally64 in a straightforward manner: Despite the 
coordinatisation being a conventional labelling system, it can be used to represent an 
objective pattern of relations –an objectivity that mirrored in the coordinate-independence 
of the spatiotemporal statement. 
This also leads us to a natural relational definition of a field65, namely as the relatum of the 
complex or network of relations amongst events, represented by the field variables. This 
network encodes the diatopochronic/spatiotemporal identity of the object, i.e. what 
connects two events that pertain to the same object. These relations that ground 
spatiotemporal identity are visualised by the 4D trajectories:  A point particle with a 
worldline; a (local) field with a worldtube or worldcone. Let us spell out this sketch with a 
simple example: The different values of the scalar field   represent the relations that hold 
amongst events that pertain to one substance ref[ ]. Here, to distinguish between these 
relations   holding amongst events and the substance to which they pertain (i.e. the 
substance that changes), we have designated the latter by ref[ ]. Via a coordinisation 
(diffeomorphism)  : ℳ → ℝ  one spreads labels over the bare manifold ℳ, which 
represents all possible events in (= changes that happen to) ref[ ], thus inducing an 
(arbitrary) order amongst them. The “field configuration”   ∘  : ℳ → ℝ now represents the 
relations amongst possible events in ref[ ]. The dynamics of   is governed by the field 
equations, that is they encode the different relations (represented by  ) between different 
events. Note that the use of the term “dynamics of  ” (or “evolution”, which we deliberately 
avoided) prima facie suggests that   is changing. This is misleading:   represents how 
changes in ref[ ] are related. The field equations tell us what these relations are; 
alternately, if one wants to speak in terms of change: how the relations between two events 
vary over different pairs of change. Given now some initial value data (taking the initial value 
problem    to be well-posed), applying   to the initial value data, which serve as reference 
values for the relations, now yields what future events in ref[ ] will occur. Let this brief 
outline suffice for our present purposes. 
What can we learn from such a relational interpretation of coordinates and fields? We 
submit, there are three immediate lessons:  
- It refutes Field’s popular argument that, since modern field theory by the very 
definition of a field assigns properties to spacetime points or regions, spacetime as a 
whole should count as a substance66. So our counterexample shows that, by itself, 
Field’s argument does not conclusively demonstrate the substantiality of spacetime 
(understood here tentatively as whatever is represented by ℳ).  
                                                          
64
 Dieks (2001) elaborates on this, discussing also this relational interpretation of coordinates in pre-relativistic 
settings. 
65
 Cf. loc. cit., esp. section 5, for a similar account.  
66
 Field (1980) 
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- In fact, in our whole discussion so far, the question of what ref[   ] is in particular 
has not yet been touched upon at all: More generally, the field theoretical formalism 
(more precisely: the field configuration) by itself only specifies the relations between 
events. It does not reveal the substance in which the events occur. For that one 
needs to supplement the formalism with an interpretation; the latter in turn requires 
an ontology. For instance, the 2-dimensional wave equation 
 ² 
  ²
+
 ² 
  ²
−
 
 ²
 ² 
  ²
= 0 
(with some given parameter k in units of a velocity) only relates unspecified events. 
That ref[ ] is a (homogeneous) membrane, e.g. the skin of a drum, fixed at both 
ends and with the properties of “linear mass density” (represented by  ) and 
“tension” (represented by  ), both of which related via   =   / ), and that   
represents the vertical displacements of the membrane, requires the “semantic 
axioms” (Bunge) of an interpretation. The latter presupposes some (at least implicit, 
“intuitive”) understanding of the ontological categories “substance” or “properties” 
that underlie the model with its ontological commitment to a predicated substance, 
called “membrane”. 
- Our definition of a field easily satisfies an important desideratum of relationalism67: 
No irreducible, monadic spatiotemporal properties need appear in a correct analysis 
of the spatiotemporal idiom68.  
Remark: The identification of coordinatisation as merely unphysical labeling deflates the 
meaning of the diff(ℳ)-invariance (General Covariance) of GR: Generally covariant 
equations take on a coordinate-independent form, reflecting, as we saw, that the relations 
expressed in them are objective. General Covariance of geometric spacetime theories 
ensures directly the objectivity and reality (independence of conventional labels) of the 
relations represented by generally covariant equations69. A change of coordinates only 
                                                          
67
 As Earman’s “third theme” R3 of traditional relationalism requires, cf. Earman (1989), p. 13. 
68
 Dieks (2001) is also explicit about this. 
69
 Our position over whether General Covariance has physical significance or is physically vacuous, cf. Norton 
(1993) for a historical review, is not that per se it has physical content. Rather we want to underscore two 
points: 
- General Covariance ensures objectivity/reality of the encoded relations. As our focus has shifted to 
objective geometric characteristics and relations of worldlines, we’re interested in the relevant 
invariants, which do not depend on the conventional choice of coordinate systems.  
- General Covariance inherits physical significance from the geometrisation paradigm, i.e. the 
identification of inertial and gravitational effects. The recent drift of the debate towards gauge 
aspects, cf. Pooley (2015), comes close to our point: The gauge group of geometric objects (as 
mathematical objects) is indeed diff(ℳ).  
Our appeal to both objectivity and the geometrisation paradigm resembles the one Einstein seems to have had 
in mind with his “private” version of the point coincidence argument, cf. Stachel (2014), Sect. 2.5, according to 
which physical events are constituted by intersections of worldlines and therefore such intersections must be 
preserved, as reflected in General Covariance.  
Notice how this sheds light on Kretschmann’s trick to make any special-relativistic equation generally-covariant 
by essentially firstly re-placing the Minkowski metric by a general metric and secondly postulating that the 
associated Riemann tensor vanish, cf. Norton (1993), Ch. 5. What is going on here? The first step, the “general-
covariantisation” of the originally special-relativistic equation, say, for the massive Klein Gordon Equation, i.e. 
the transition [    ∂  ∂ +M
 ]ϕ = 0 → [   ∇ ∇ +M
 ]ϕ = 0, reflects the fact that the described 
phenomenon is real/objective (coordinate-independent). So far, however, the general-covariantised Klein-
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changes the labeling - an intrinsically meaningless prop, anyway: A change in coordinates 
does not correspond to an active shifts. Diffeomorphism transformations only have a passive 
meaning: We simply use a different labeling system. This denial of equating “Hole 
Transformations” 70 with active shifts, which describe a physically distinct world, blocks the 
Hole Argument71. According to our relationalist reading of coordinates, diffeomorphically 
equivalent models describe the same world72.       
Having identified the manifold points as representations of events, one naturally might 
wonder: How are two events connected to each other? Here the differences between the 
metric and other fields will come to fore: The latter, e.g. a scalar field  , only specify that 
there is a relation between events, as an otherwise primitive intrinsic pattern amongst 
events in the same substance ref[ ]; the relations we represent via the metric on the other 
hand display a distinctly extrinsic character, expressing properties that hold in virtue of 
certain relations73, rather than depending on the internal state of the objects involved.– a 
first cue that ref(   ) may not be some all-pervading substance we call “spacetime”. Upon 
closer inspection, how to connect two events comprises two facets:  
1. Are there in some sense natural connections between events? Via which paths can 
two points be linked? Via which chain of events does a causal influence propagate 
from one event to another? This is what the geodesic/inertial structure (more 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Gordon Equation as it stands holds for every reference frame – obviously far beyond the domain of empirical 
validity. The second step, the additional postulate      [ ] ≡ 0,  now implicitly picks out a class of physically 
distinguished trajectories (spatiotemporal relations), namely those that move along geodesics w.r.t. to the Levi-
Civita connection of Minkowski spacetime. With the general-covariantised Klein-Klein Equation in conjunction 
with this additional postulate, the claim that the relations represented by ϕ  is restricted to the class of inertial 
frames. 
The situation thus is completely analogous to GR: The Einstein Equations pick out the distinguished trajectories 
or relations, whereas General Covariance of a given general-relativistic matter field equation reflects the 
objectivity of the pertinent phenomenon.  
(In more standard parlance the general-relativistic matter field equations and the Einstein 
Equations/Kretschmannisation pick out the dynamically possible and kinematically possible models, 
respectively cf. Pooley (2015), pp. 11. ) 
70
 An active shifting of all physical states of affairs, which would correspond to a displacements of objects plus 
their worldlines (leaving the coordinate chart untouched), does make a physical difference: If shifted 
trajectories deviate from geodesics, inertial effects occur; but even if the geodesic nature of a body’s worldline 
is not altered, for instance, when we subject the body to a time-translation, an observable effect occurs: Think 
of shifting two points along great circles on the surface of a sphere; a shift can result in collision of the two 
points! Only for the special case of pseudo-Euclidean geometry do active shifts not result in discernible 
situations, cf. Nerlich (1994), Ch. 6 and 9. In short: While in a geometric spacetime setting invariance under 
passive shifts simply reflects coordinate-independence of the real effects, the claim that “General Relativity is 
distinguished from other dynamical field theories by its invariance under active diffeomorphisms." Gaul and 
Rovelli (2000), p. 30, is false: GR is not invariant under active shifts. The latter are physically discernible 
operations. 
71
 Cf. Norton (2015) or Stachel (2014). 
72
 Cf. Nerlich (1994), Ch. 6 and 9, for a similar point 
73
 Cf. Weatherson (2012), esp. sect. 2.3 
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specifically: parallel transport), embodied by the –aptly dubbed- connection    
  , 
provides74: A distinguished path, viz. geodesics, between events.  
2. How are distances between events measured? This is chronogeometric function of 
the metric, which equips the distinguished path with a measure.   
In the standard formalism our manifold is supplemented by both a metric and metric-affine 
structure. With the above elucidations75 we have thus arrived at a natural ontological 
identification of the status of what both represent, namely relations: The metric-affine 
structure picks out those connections between events that are physically distinguished, viz. 
the inertial trajectories; the metric equips this path which a notion of spatiotemporal 
distance as well as the lightcone-structure.  
But why should we postulate such structure in the first place? Let us apply the realist 
strategy mentioned in section 2: 
- All established spacetime theories take for granted inertial frames as primitive, 
physically distinguished class of reference frames in order to account for all the 
inertial effects we experience directly every day. (We’ll elaborate on this in a bit.) In 
geometric spacetime theories geodesics (as defined by parallel transport w.r.t. to the 
affine-structure) take over this role of distinguished trajectories76. Scientific realism 
now abductively encourages that the postulated inertial frames should be taken 
seriously in the sense that affine structure may be assumed to represent an element 
of reality, viz. inertial structure.  
- By the same argument, since the metric structure features in the explanation of 
observable effects77, such as gravitational redshift, we may again abductively infer 
that it corresponds to something real. Its geometric interpretation as a measure of 
spatiotemporal distances is vindicated via the experimentally well-corroborated s.c. 
Clock Hypothesis78, which equates the proper time measured by a commoving clock 
with the length of that cure as determined by the metric.  
                                                          
74
 Equivalently, of course, one may assign the geodesic structure to a derivative operator   with which the 
manifold is endowed, cf. Malament (2012), Ch. 1.7. The connection and the derivative operator are uniquely 
determined by    (  ) =    
      where     denotes the unit vectors that span the tangent space. 
75
 Axiomatically, the identification of affine structure as inertial and the chronogeometric structure is achieved 
by “interpretative principles” which specify the conformal and affine/projective structure via their respective 
physical instantiation in terms of the behaviour of point particles and light rays, cf. loc. cit. (2012), Ch. 2.1. 
Whether these “interpretative principles” or “semantic axioms” (Bunge), are necessary or whether they follow 
from GR is a different issue, see footnote 84. 
76
 It is worthwhile pointing out that Einstein placed a special emphasis on the status of the geodesic postulate 
as a generalisation of Newton’s 2
nd
 Axiom, cf. Lehmkuhl (2014). The crucial point is that in geometrised 
spacetime theories, Newtonian or Minkowskian inertial frames morph into affine-structure (the uniqueness of 
which is guaranteed by the Equivalence Principle in the sense of indistinguishability of inertial and gravitational 
effects), see also Knox (2013).  
77
 Cf. Will (2014) for a comprehensive review of all the different tests GR has been subjected to. 
78
 Cf. Fletcher (2013), who also proves that for every timelike curve such a clock of arbtritrary precision exists. 
One may in fact, reverse the argument to the extent that “the ‘geometrical’ hypothesis linking the behaviour of 
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A priori the metric and the affine structure need not be related79. Motivated, however, for 
instance by demanding that (affinely parameterized) geodesics on the manifold,  ̇ ∇  ̇
  =
ẍ  +    
  ẋ ẋ  = 0 , should also extremalise the worldline element  
  
      , the simplest 
choice would be metric compatibility:    
  =
1
2
          +       −       . Thus, metric 
compatibility, as prevalent in GR80,81, unifies the chronogeometric and inertial structure82. 
In short, we propose that spacetime is represented by the triple   ,  
  
,   83, where the 
metric represents chronogeometric structure and the metrically compatible connection ∇ 
represents inertial structure. Both are to be construed as relations between events. We’ll 
see in a bit that this claim is consistent with the actual physics and sheds some light on 
issues surrounding gravitational energy in GR.  
Let us pause for a moment to make three observations that make contact with the existing 
relationalism/substantivalism literature: 
- The standard abductive arguments for substantivalism that appeal to inertial 
effects, such as Newton’s Bucket Experiment, are all beside the point: Neither 
spacetime substantivalism nor relationalism can explain inertial effects! What both 
ontological approaches must postulate as a brute fact are a physically distinguished 
trajectories, i.e. inertial structure84. That such a distinguished trajectory may be 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
ideal clocks to the […] ‘metric’ field is in principle dispensable” (Pooley (2015), p. 3): It need not be postulated 
separately. 
79
 For instance, in s.c. Palatini f(R) Gravity, cf. Sotiriou et al. (2007), the connection (with which a derivative 
operator and the Riemann tensor are defined) and is not the Levi-Civita connection of the metric: Geodesics 
w.r.t. the connection do not extemalise the line element. 
80
 It’s a striking feature of GR (and more generally, a certain class of alternative theories of gravity, s.c. 
“Lovelock Gravity”, cf. Padmanabhan/Kothawala (2013), pp. 9., that this unification follows from both the 
inertial and the chronogeometric structure being treated as dynamical, independent structures, subject to 
variation in the formulation of GR (the s.c. Palatini variation), cf., for instance, Hobson et al. (2006), Ch. 19.11. 
81
  By contrast, this unification gets lost in Newton-Cartan Theory, where the chronogeometric structure is 
encoded in the two metrics, the temporal and the spatial one, and the inertial structure is encoded in a 
separate derivative operator, cf. Malament (2012), Ch. 4.1.   
82
 Einstein himself viewed the revolutionary core of GR, as represented by (ℳ,    , ∇), in the unification 
between inertia and chronogeometry , a unification that manifests itself in the Levi-Civita connection Γ  
  , as it 
appears in the the geodesic equation, interpreted as a generalisation of Newton’s 2
nd
 Law, cf. Lehmkuhl (2014). 
83
 Don’t conflate spacetime represented by (ℳ,    , ∇) and the universe! The latter corresponds to the system 
composed of all material objects –and is a substance itself, cf. Bunge (2007). It’s characterized by the tuple 
( ,    ). 
84
 One might argue though that, since the Einstein Equations imply the Geodesic Principle, i.e. the fact that in 
absence of external forces bodies follow geodesics, GR indeed explains inertia. Einstein himself thought so for a 
while. In fact, that the Bianchi identities imply the geodesic equations of motion for relativistic dust is a 
standard textbook exercise, cf., for instance, Hobson et al. (2008), Ch. 8.8. (Similarly, in the geometric optics 
approximation it can be derived that electromagnetic waves propagate along null-hypersurfaces, cf. Wald 
(1984), pp. 70.) Furthermore, the s.c. Geroch-Jang Theorem extends this in a rigorous manner to matter other 
than dust that satisfies the strong energy condition, cf., for instance, Weatherall (2012), Sect. 3. However, 
Tamir (2011) has subtly argued against the claim that GR contains the Geodesic Principle, pointing out in 
particular that all realistic matter models violate the strong energy-condition. Weatherall (2012) takes up the 
idea, esp. Sect. 4,  arguing, however, that if one adopts a modified notion of explanation, namely the one he 
proposes (“puzzleball view”), sect. 5, GR does explain inertia. 
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assumed, however, is good practice of a scientific realist, as we saw just now: Our 
best theories cannot eliminate inertial reference systems: “Contemporary space—
time theories show a ubiquitous need for inertial structure as a theoretical 
construct.”85; any departure from inertial motion elicits well-corroborated effects.  It 
is the ontological construal of this physically distinguished class of trajectories, where 
the substantivalist and the relationalist differ: For the substantivalist the physical 
distinction originates in the intrinsic properties of spacetime – without being able to 
offer a proper theory that explains this distinction from its intrinsic properties. The 
relationalist, on the other hand, simply claims that there exists a distinguished chain 
of relations connecting two pair of events86. Both take inertial structure as a 
primitive. The point of contention between the relationalists and substantivalists is a 
purely ontological, conceptual one! Here we clearly, see why Leibnizian- relationalism 
(the ontological issue just mentioned) and Machian relationalism must be kept apart: 
The latter seeks a theory that can account for, i.e. explain the physical distinction of 
inertial trajectories – a distinction that the former must accept as a datum and give it 
a satisfactory conceptual analysis. Note, however, that the innovation of GR to treat 
inertial structure as dynamical (via metric compatibility) is a necessary first step 
towards a Machian relationalism: If one wants to derive inertial structure, it surely 
cannot be fixed. 
- In principle, one might also consider promoting the inertial structure (absolute 
acceleration) to the status of a primitive, intrinsic property of a body, as Sklar has 
proposed87, emphasizing that this acceleration absolutism does not necessarily 
conflict with Leibniz-relationalism. His proposal has been criticised elsewhere88 in 
detail; we only add what seems to be in favour of our own case: 
o It remains, as he himself admits, only a sketch; crucial details need still to be 
fleshed out. 
o Our ontological and semantic proposal is close and natural to the formalism, 
as we outlined above.  
o If in GR the affine and metric structure are unified by metric compatibility, 
they should have the same ontological status, as it has in our proposal. For 
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 Teller (1991), p. 377. According to Teller, a substantivalist might then argue  that since inertial structure must 
be structure of something, “this something is precisely what we have in mind when we talk about the manifold 
of space-time points, substantivally conceived”, loc. cit. Such an argument falls into the error we anticipated 
above: Even if a conceptual entity has properties, we may not infer that what the latter represents is 
necessarily a substance. In the jargon of the field: Mind the type-token difference! 
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 Cf. loc.cit., Sect. IV. To do justice to the relationalists before the advent of non-geometric spacetime theories, 
one may summarise the jist of their methodologically attractive and heuristically indeed fertile complaints as a 
mismatch between the spacetime symmetries and the dynamical symmetries describing matter, cf. Pooley 
(2013), Ch 4.2. This surplus structure is then criticized as being unobservable. To give a concrete example: The 
Galilei group as the symmetry group of Newton’s absolute space and time is a proper subgroup of the Leibniz 
group. The relationalists’ methodological demand that this unobservable structure be minimized, if not 
eliminated, is realised in geometrised spacetime theories, where gravitation has been incorporated into the 
spacetime geometry. 
87
 Cf. Sklar (1974), pp. 229-332 
88
 Cf. Earman (1989), Ch. 6.9 
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the metric structure, however, it make no sense to consider it as an intrinsic 
property (‘“Sklarise” it’): A well-posed question about a distance involves two 
points, between which the distance relation holds.    
o An independent, more direct argument for the relational status of the metric 
can be constructed from the following syllogism: (P1) The ontological status 
(denoted by “[.]”) of the objects represented by the l.h.s. and the r.h.s. of an 
equation must be the same. Take as an example   =   ², irrespective of its 
exact meaning89: [ ] is a property, namely energy, [   ] = [ ] is likewise a 
property, namely rest-mass. (P2) Manipulations like differentiation w.r.t. its 
arguments do not change the ontological status of the object: They merely 
specify local changes, zooming in as it were on infinitesimal details without 
altering the ontological category. The (time-dependent) mass ratio of two 
chemicals, for instance, is a relation; so is its rate of change.  (P3) The energy-
momentum tensor expresses a relation90. (P1-3), together with the Einstein 
Equations, entail: [   ] = [   ] = [   ], i.e. the metric likewise expresses a 
relation. A similar argument applies to the affine structure. 
The reader might level a natural objection against our claim that spacetime is a relation: 
Wouldn’t, according to our ontological terminology, the non-substantival nature of 
spacetime entail that it didn’t have any properties? What then with curvature?- Indeed, we 
deny that spacetime possesses any properties91! W.r.t. the curvature, the distinction 
between the object and its representation becomes crucial: Curvature is a mathematical 
property only of the mathematical object that represents spacetime; i.e. the Riemann tensor 
     
   is a function not of spacetime, but of the metric (as a mathematical object) and its 
derivatives:      
  =  [ Γ ] 
  + Γ [ 
  Γ ] 
  . 
Let us close this section with a remark on pre-GR spacetimes. Essentially all our arguments 
carry through also for the Minkowski spacetime of SR (and neo-Newtonian spacetime of 
Newton-Cartan-Theory): Minkowskian spacetime is represented by the triple 
 ℝ   , η  , ∇
( )  and best construed as the totality of possible and actual relations between 
events. Note that the immutability of Minkowski spacetime is particularly natural to 
apprehend, since it is “absolute” (in Friedman’s first sense of the word92). 
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 The correct interpretation of this s.c. Mass-Energy Equivalence turns out to be not so easy, cf. Fernflores 
(2012) 
90
 Cf. Lehmkuhl (2010) 
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 Bunge (1977) also points this out. Einstein himself seems to have articulated this intuition at some point. In a 
letter to E. Mach from 1913 he writes: “It seems to me an absurdity to ascribe space physical properties.” 
(quoted in Brown/Lehmkuhl (2013)).    
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 Friedman (1983), p 208 distinguishes three meanings of “absolute”: a) independent of a reference frame, as 
opposed to “relative” (for instance, within Newtonian Mechanics e.g. spatial distance, or within GR rotation 
relative to a local inertial system); b) non-dynamical (for instance, the speed of light in Special Relativity) and c) 
substantival (as opposed to relational), on which our discussion here focuses. Our analysis illustrated: A 
dynamical quantity needn’t represent a substance, whereas a substance must always be represented by a 
variable that is both dynamical and non-relative. 
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For the benefit of the reader we list the results of our semantical analysis in the following 
table: 
element in the formalism  …represents… ontological status 
manifold ℳ totality of possible events in the World All possible changes 
metric structure     chronogeometric structure spatiotemporal distances 
affine structure (parallel transport) 
∇ 
inertial structure spatiotemporal paths 
 (ℳ,    , ∇) Spacetime Totality of spatiotemporal 
relations between possible 
events in the World 
Coordinates ordering/labeling system for events Conventions 
General Covariance of a law Objectivity of the represented pattern  - 
 
It’s instructive to contrast our own relationalism against metric (field) substantivalism, 
which has been argued to be the most defensible form of substantivalism93. It states that the 
pair (ℳ,    ) represents spacetime and that the latter is a substance. 
- Three main virtues commend themselves for metric substantivalism: 
o It accounts for the fact that the bare manifold by itself lacks the salient 
features of spacetime (e.g. light-cone structure, past-future-distinction, etc.) 
that constitute explanatory core and the essential the metric plays. 
o It is not bound to the notion of primitive identity of manifold points 
(“hæcceitism”: the postulate that the points of the manifold are individuated 
in virtue of empirically elusive properties) – a manœuvre the Hole Argument94 
forces the advocate of “manifold substantivalism” to resort to95. 
o Regarding the metric as a substance, like any other field, chimes with the 
popular view, natural to quantum field theoreticians96 with little sympathy for 
the geometric spirit of GR, reflecting in particular, that it seems to carry 
energy. 
Let us comment on these tenets: 
We agree with Hoefer’s analysis that the concept of primitive identity of manifold points 
should be relinquished as an ad hoc manœuvre. Like us, Hoefer couches his analysis (albeit 
implicitly) in a substance ontology: “A modern-day substantivalist thinks that space is a kind 
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 Cf. Hoefer (1996).   
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 Cf. Norton (2015) or Stachel (2014) for a review. 
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 Cf. op. cit., where the manœuvre is dismissed as ad hoc.  
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  A textbook written explicitly in this field-theorectical spirit is Weinberg (1972). 
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of thing that can […] exist independently of material things […] and which is properly 
described as having its own properties […]”97. 
However, even though we agree with Hoefer that the manifold together with the metric 
does represent decisive spatiotemporal features, this is not the whole story: (ℳ,    ) only 
captures the chronogeometric structure that defines spatiotemporal lengths; the 
conceptually distinct -albeit contingently related- inertial structure must still be accounted 
for - by extending the spacetime model to the triple (ℳ,    , ∇).  
We also reject the third argument: Its first part, the common linguistic practice as a fait 
social, is irrelevant for any systematic analysis; its second part, the fact that metric 
substantivalism accommodates for gravitational energy, becomes moot, since, as we and 
Hoefer himself argued elsewhere98, gravitational energy does in fact not exist in GR.  
 
5. Discussion 
So far, we have mostly operated conceptually. Time to make a more specific connection to 
the results previously achieved in our analysis of gravitational energy and gravitational 
waves: 
Elsewhere99 we had argued that gravitational energy (energy attributable to spacetime) 
does not exist within GR. Our main line of interwoven arguments was twofold:  
- All known definitions of gravitational energy presuppose background structures and 
involve ad hoc assumptions that do not hold for generic spacetimes. 
- An evaluation of these conditions yielded that they considerably narrow down the 
solution space:  
o Known, numerous and natural counterexamples exist – hardly a surprise for a 
background-independent theory such as GR. 
o Even our cosmological standard  model (ΛCDM) does not comply with these 
conditions. 
o They are unphysical/unstable: Tiny deviations from suitable models lead to 
models that violate again the conditions. 
o In themselves, their motivation is dubious (e.g. already the plane gravitational 
wave violates them). 
- We concluded that, since for a concept to be fundamental/essential in the 
framework of a scientific theory, it must be applicable to a sufficiently large class of 
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 Hoefer (1996), p. 5. (Note, however, that his claim Einstein had espoused a metric substantivalism is wrong. 
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typical situations and must not hinge on very specific contingent conditions, 
gravitational energy is not fundamental to GR.  
- Retrospectively this result makes sense: “If gravitational force has somehow been 
compromised - geometrised away- then we should expect the same to happen to 
[....] ENERGY and MOMENTUM”100.  
Is there a connection between the non-existence of general-relativistic gravitational energy 
and the main result of our preceding ontological analysis that spacetime is a relation? We 
submit that there are two important links: 
1) We argued that it is necessary for a material substance to possess energy. (Non-
material substances, i.e. abstracta, do not ontically exist.) From this angle, the non-
existence of gravitational energy is a consistency check for relationalism: If 
gravitational energy did in fact exist, our relationalism would be inconsistent.  
 
2) Our ontological relationalism can in fact explain the non-existence of gravitational 
energy.  
- Let us first ponder: Does spacetime change? We propose it doesn’t. Consider the 
epitome of a putatively changing spacetime: a gravitational wave passing through an 
interferometric detector. The wave changes the proper lengths of the detector arms, 
thereby inducing a difference in running times of laser pulses travelling back and 
forth, a difference that gives rise to detectable interference patterns.  On the face of 
it looks as if spacetime has changed with the passage of the gravitational wave. 
However this is not so: We are comparing two different pairs of events; the 
spatiotemporal relations between them are different, too. Saying that spacetime has 
changed, would require one pair of events and their spatiotemporal relations to be 
treated legitimately as a reference value. But there is no cogent reason to do that: GR 
lacks all absolute spacetime background structures that might justify privileging a 
relation among one specific pair of events as the default relation.  
Put slightly differently: The Einstein Eqations serve as a black box giving the right 
metric, the corresponding Levi-Civita connection of which then picks out inertial 
frames. (In that respect the Einstein Equations take up the role of the demand that 
the Riemann tensor vanish in Kretschmannisation (see footnote 64): They pick out 
and fix, by fiat, the class of inertial frames, the class of physically distinguished 
relations between events.) Each pair of events is assigned a spatiotemporal relation – 
no change is involved in the assignment of these relations: They are fixed. 
In conclusion, spacetime does not change. 
- Now recall that we identified energy as a quantification/measure of changeability. 
Absent any genuine notion of change of spatiotemporal relations, a fortiori the 
changeability of spatiotemporal relations cannot be quantified: Gravitational energy, 
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 Norton (2001), p. 21 (Norton’s emphases). 
25 
 
as the energy attributable to spacetime, does not exist. (Recall the difference pointed 
out in section 3 between “having no energy” and “having zero energy”.)    
Misner et al. even give a related explanation for the non-definability of gravitational 
energy in a generic spacetime such as a closed universe: “To weigh something one 
needs a platform on which to stand to do the weighing”101 – an illustration that can 
be rendered non-metaphorical now: The definability of gravitational energy requires 
background structure as a somehow privileged reference entity, background 
structure that turns out to be contingent, thus undermining the fundamentality of 
gravitational energy. 
Remark: By contrast, for the relations expressed in matter field configurations (recall 
our sketch of a relationalist definition of a field in section 4) we do have a natural 
way to pick out a class of privileged default relations, namely both the dynamical 
symmetries of the matter field itself and the background spacetime structure 
(especially when the latter is highly symmetric, as it is for all practical purposes of 
(quantum) field theories on a curved spacetime). 
 
A remark is in order on those cases where an ersatz for gravitational energy in its various 
incarnations is possible102, glossing for the time being over our arguments against the 
fundamentality of gravitational energy in general. According to the Positive Energy 
Theorem103, such gravitational ersatz energy turns out always to be positive – an important 
property for the coherence (e.g. in terms of stability) to the standard view of spacetime 
carrying energy. Thus, the spacetime in general and the gravitational wave in particular 
would satisfy our proposed sufficient conditions for material substantiality. Thus, we can 
explain why spacetime and gravitational waves so beguilingly look like substances in such 
cases! In the case of gravitational waves this explanations renders explicit the ontological 
presuppositions underlying Isaacson’s variational approach104: Here, from the outset, the 
gravitational wave is de facto treated like an ordinary matter field. In this respect, the 
gravitational energy is an artifact of the implicit ontology: Material substantiality in – energy 
out. 
Let us turn now to the status of vacuum solutions, a notorious bee in any relationalist’s 
bonnet. 
According to substance ontologies, for a relation to exist, there must be relata, between 
which such relations hold. Consequently, relations between matter-free spacetime points 
and vacuum solutions in general, prima facie look like stumbling stones for any relationalis: 
Several authors have claimed to show the spacetime structure a relationalist may according 
to his own standards legitimately avail himself of, viz. spatiotemporal relations between 
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matter-occupied points, is explanatorily insufficient105. It seems, a relationalist is committed 
to discard globally vacuum solutions as non-physical – a disturbing view for the science-
loving realist, since after all gravitational waves are vacuum solutions: Why, if they are non-
physical anyway, invest millions of pounds into gravitational wave detectors such as LIGO?  
These claims, however, are premised on a “narrow relationalism” (Teller), “the view that the 
actual space-time relations between actual bodies and events exhaust all the facts about 
space-time”106. According to a “narrow relationalist” only spatiotemporal relations between 
actually matter-occupied spacetime points are ontologically legitimate. We reject this 
restriction to actual material relata, instead adopting a “liberalised relationalism” (Teller), 
which recognises not only the actual, but also the scheme of space-time relations of actual 
or hypothetical objects to each other.107 Only relations between matter-occupied points 
represent actual spatiotemporal relations, as opposed to only possible ones represented by 
relations between matter-unoccupied points: If there were two specks of dust with 
negligible mass-energy at the respective spacetime points, how would they be 
spatiotemporally related?     
Is this possibility-admitting extension du domaine de la lutte an ad hoc strategy? On the 
contrary; rather the restriction to only actualities is - presumably a relic from an 
empiricism108 seeking a way to ascend inductively from observable data to theories. In any 
theory, the mathematical formalism and its formal solutions must be supplemented by 
additional requirements that select physical solutions, i.e. restrict the formal solution space 
of possible, abstract/mathematical model to realistic, actual solutions. Consider three 
examples: 1. As far as we know electric charge comes only in integer multiples of 1/3 e. 
Nonetheless all electrodynamical equations also carry over to even non-integer multiples, 
which are nomological possibilia. 2. Despite the weirdness of their characteristics, such as 
imaginary masses, superluminal particles, s.c. tachyons, can formally be treated within 
Special Relativity109; to be sure: given the data, their existence is highly unlikely, though. 3. 
As a last example, recall that the state vector of quantum many-particle systems empirically, 
turns out to be either symmetric or anti-symmetric, in the bosonic and fermionic case, 
respectively. Formally, however, nothing forbids a mixed symmetric many particle-state110, 
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i.e. some particles transforming symmetrically and others anti-symmetrically: Nature simply 
seems not to realize this possibility. 
In the same vein, the formal solution space of the Einstein Equations also contains possible 
spatiotemporal relations, i.e. spatiotemporal relations betwen hypothetical test particles; 
actual spatiotemporal relations on the other hand are those that are represented by metric 
or affine connections between matter-occupied manifold points. One could argue that 
Einstein, in the aftermath of de Sitter’s discovery of cosmological solutions of the Einstein 
Equations, viewed Mach’s Principle in this sense111, viz. as an ontological selection rule to 
demarcate actual, physical from only possible, formal solutions112.  
Remark: Inserting a cosmological constant Λ in the Einstein Equations,     =      − Λ   , 
and interpreting it as the zero point energy induced by a quantum field, rescues the 
actuality/physicality even of “vacuum” solutions (also for the “narrow relationalist”). These  
solutions then are, strictly speaking, no longer vacuum solutions, because there would exist 
a physical (albeit quantum) matter field filling the cosmic voids. Unfortunately, this strategy 
has so far failed spectacularly as “probably the worst prediction in the history of physics”113 - 
with a discrepancy between observation and theoretical prediction of more than 120 orders 
of magnitude114. Note also that the interpretation of the cosmological constant as vacuum 
density is not cogent (albeit natural)115: It could be just a free parameter of the minimal 
modification of the original Einstein Equations, not describing Dark Energy (in the sense of a 
material source of unknown type) but, as it were, “Dark Geometry”.     
Let us reply to two objections against liberalized relationalism. The first one concerns the 
suspicion that liberalized relationalism “serves to obscure the substantive aspects in the 
(relationalism/substantivalism) debate”116, the second worries about ontological parsimony. 
We submit, neither is justified:     
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- Earman sharply rejects liberalized relationalism on the grounds of “eroding the 
difference between relationalism and substantivalism; indeed the notion that space 
points are permanent possibilities of location for bodies is one plausible reading of 
Newton’s ‘De Gravitatione’”117. However, in what he proclaims, Earman misses the 
crucial point of the substantivalism/relationalism debate: As we clarified in section 2, 
it revolves around the ontological category of spacetime (substance, property or 
relation).  
- Teller concedes: “The ontology of liberalized relationalism may appear to be just as 
rich as, and perhaps in some sense isomorphic to the ontology of substantivalism.”118 
One might therefore anticipate the criticism that it smuggles in all the entities back in 
through the backdoor that the relationalism had wanted to get rid of in the first 
place, appealing to Occam’s razor: Note, however, that the appeal to Occam’s razor 
is misplaced in a twofold way:  
o Firstly, it refers to actual entities (entia), not possible ones (possibilia). How 
could it: Any theory admits an infinitude of possible entities! Obviously, we 
have not multiplied the actualia. 
o Secondly, Occam’s razor states demands “entia non sunt multiplicanda 
praeter necessitatem”. As we have seen already, the necessity of postulating 
the existence of inertial structure as primitive, thus physically distinguishing a 
class of trajectories in order to account for inertial effects, is beyond any 
doubt for both parties. So should we regard accounting for possible 
phenomena as unnecessary? As we argued and illustrated, we shouldn’t: It is 
an indispensable part of the explanatory labour of scientific theories also to 
cover hypothetical cases. After all, how to make any new discoveries, when 
shackling our theoretical curiosity to the confines of already known actualia?  
In sum: Occam’s Razor does not excise a “liberalized relationalism”. 
 
Let us eventually harvest the last fruits of ontological labours w.r.t. the putative interaction 
between matter and spacetime, sometimes presented as the take-home message of 
Einstein’s GR.  
Causality and whether an object acts upon another, are commonly taken to involve energy 
transfer from one object (or event) to the other119. This distinguishes causal relations (“a ball 
breaks a window”) from non-causal relations (“night follows day”) –the Humean tradition, 
which sought to eliminate causality in philosophical parlance in favour of contingent, 
correlational regularities, notwithstanding. The lack of “spacetime energy” has three 
immediate consequences in terms of causality: 
                                                          
117
 Loc. cit. 
118
 Teller (1991), p. 365 
119
 Cf. Bunge (1977), Ch. 6.5 and references therein, esp. the monograph on causality by the same author. 
29 
 
1. Wheeler’s famous slogan “Space acts on matter, telling it how to move. In turn, 
matter reacts back on space, telling it how to curve”120 must not be understood in 
terms of a causal influence of spacetime upon matter and vice versa. Instead, the 
Einstein equations should be understood as mutual constraints, i.e. an identification 
of the matter energy-stress tensor as the source term of the dynamical equation for 
the metric. In this respect, in a dynamical fashion, the Einstein Equations take over 
the role Kretschmann’s      [ ] ≡ 0 had in picking out the physically privileged 
metric and affine-structure, i.e. in determining the right chronogeometric and inertial 
structure of the kinematically possible models. 
Schrödinger makes the same point about a non-causal understanding of the Einstein 
Equations: “Just in the same way as Laplace’s equation       ⃗ =   says nothing but: 
wherever the divergence of   ⃗  is non-zero, we say there is a charge and call       ⃗  the 
density of charge. Charge does not cause the electric vector to have a non-vanishing 
divergence, it is this non-vanishing divergence. In the same way, matter does not 
cause the geometrical quantity, which forms the first member of the above [i.e. the 
Einstein] equation to be different from zero“121. Recall our earlier remark that the 
energy-momentum tensor is a misnomer: A more appropriate, unwieldy name would 
be the “energy-momentum-related source-density functional of the matter variables 
and the metric for the dynamics of the metric”122. 
 
2. Thus, gravitational waves cannot cause anything or act on anything. This does not 
mean, of course, they don’t have any effects: A gravitational waves that hits a 
detector reveals itself as an effect – an effect, however, that, as we argued, reflects 
the difference in the relations between two different pairs of events! One may even 
reverse the usual order of the explanatory burden: That two relations between two 
different pairs of events differ is exactly what to expect; their similarity is what 
requires an explanation. In other words: We mustn’t (metaphysically) take the highly 
symmetrical nature of pseudo-Euclidean geometry for granted, which represents 
such even a uniformity between all spatiotemporal events123. The assignment of all 
spatiotemporal relations to each pair of possible events is determined by fiat via the 
Einstein Equations, whose status in this regard is closer to a “fundamental principle” 
(Weatherall)124. 
 
Remark 1: The same argument of non-causality applies to the expansion of the 
universe: The latter needs not to be interpreted as a causal effect of spacetime; again 
the exact form of the possible and actual spatiotemporal relations between events is 
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simply dictated via the field equations - a form that predicts for instance cosmic 
expansion125.  
 
Remark 2: Similarly, rotation -such as it features prominently in the Gödel solution 
with its closed worldlines126 (which one may regard as an incarnation of Mach’s 
Bucket Experiment)- fits into the relationalist, general-relativistic framework. One 
might immediately object that global rotation is conceptually problematic for a 
relationalist, but the 4-dimensional perspective admits a precise definition in terms of 
the relative positions of geodesics (e.g., whether they intersect or recede from each 
other) via the geodesic deviation equation or the (counterparts of the) optical scalars 
(shear, vorticity and expansion): For instance, the extent to which light rays are 
twisted (think of fibers in a rope) is captured in the vorticity127. Rotation thus 
characterized by the relative positions of the geodesics, is doubly relational in nature: 
Firstly since it is defined as relative positions of geodesic, and secondly, since what 
the geodesics represent are spatiotemporal relations between events in 
(hypothetical) massive bodies.  
 
3. Spacetime and matter do not exchange energy; hence no mutual causal influence or 
interaction proper (defined as a process with energy exchange)128: The Action-
Reaction Principle, which Einstein himself at some point extolled as GR’s most 
singular virtue129, thus is not satisfied in GR! However, as Brown and Lehmkuhl 
remind us: “(N) ote that at [Einstein‘s] time it was quite common not to draw a clear 
distinction between causality and determinism“130. We therefore propose to 
attenuate the condition of the Action-Reaction Principle so as to accommodate for 
dynamical evolution of spacetime. We thus stipulate a distinction between a strong 
and a weak form of the Action-Reaction Principle: The former indeed asserts that 
spacetime and matter causally interact, i.e. exchange energy; the latter denotes 
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 By contrast, Baker (2005) has argued that the acceleration the cosmological constant gives rise is yet 
another (besides gravitational radiation) manifestation of the causal prowess of spacetime. Consequently, we 
should regard spacetime as a substance. The argument is multiply flawed, however: Firstly, whether Λ can be 
construed as a feature of the spacetime geometry or whether it stems from unknown source of matter, e.g. as 
the density fluctuations of a quantum field, is an open debate! Most physicists seem to favour the latter option. 
Secondly, given it is a free parameter of the Einstein Equations: This doesn’t mean it corresponds to any 
property of spacetime; it would merely be a given parameter in the field equations. Thirdly, his appeal to 
acceleration is problematic, for two notions must be kept apart in GR: On the one hand the 4-acceleration, and 
the rate of change of the rate of change of the physical distance. For dust particle (e.g. a distant galaxy) in an 
FLRW cosmology, the 4-acceleration is zero; the physical distance to the galaxy, however, changes, manifesting 
itself by the well-known cosmological redshift. Let’s assume for the sake of the argument that acceleration is 
always brought about by a causal mechanism: Still, since the 4-acceleration is the proper general-relativistic 
counterpart to Newtonian acceleration, the argument collapses. 
126
 Cf. Malament (2012), Ch. 3 
127
 Cf. Malament (2012), Ch. 2.8.  
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 Cf. Curiel (2000), Lam (2009) and Hoefer (2009), sect. 4.2 for a similar argument.  
129
 Cf. Brown/Lehmkuhl (2013) 
130
 Footnote 5, loc. cit.  
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dynamical completeness131, i.e. the idea that in terms of dynamical evolution, matter 
fields and the metric interdepend. 
According to this terminology, GR only satisfies the weak form of the Action-Reaction 
Principle. 
 The main ontological function of the original Action-Reaction Principle carries over, 
though, to the weak form: Namely that it serves as a reality criterion for the entities 
involved132. Note, however, the difference: Whereas the strong form is a sufficient 
criterion for the represented entities that satisfy it to count as material substances, 
the weak form only yields that they are real, irrespective of their ontological 
category. Applied to GR, this confirms the multiply emphasized fact that the 
spatiotemporal structure encoded in the metric is real, but not a substance; via 
metric compatibility this carries over to the affine structure. 
Admittedly, our discussion of alleged causal agency of spacetime is limited to the extent that 
it hinges on a specific theory of causality, employing s.c. causal markers, which some may 
reject. It will be rewarding to investigate how different accounts of causality133 fare in GR134, 
in particular the Strong Action-Reaction Principle. Of special interest are, of course, 
counterfactual accounts of causality. They face a severe difficulty, however, as Curiel points 
out: Modal statements like “How would a light ray move, were a certain object X not there?” 
don’t have any obvious meaning within GR, “because however we make sense of ‘removing 
matter’ from a spacetime region, the metric will eo ipso be different in that region from 
what it was”135. Thus, “we have no way to conclude on any principled basis ‘what the metric 
would look then look like’”136. 
A proper analysis causality in various theories and their validity in GR also has a pressing 
practical aspect: If the effects brought about by the spacetime geometry are not causal, then 
the usual argument invoking causality to discard advanced wave solutions as unphysical, is 
strictly speaking no longer applicable.  
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 The only absolute elements in GR, i.e. an element exempt from dynamical completeness, are the Lorentzian 
signature of the metric and the volume element, both of which hardly qualify as fully-fledged elements. For an 
introduction to absolute structures in GR, cf. Straumann (2013), Ch. 3.5 and, in particular, Pooley (2015).   
132
 Cf. Brown/Lehmkuhl (2013) 
133
 Such as e.g. reviewed in Dowe (2007).  
134
 Lam (2009), sect. 4 and 5, discusses how a causal theory of properties, according to which it lies in the 
nature of properties to elicit certain causal effects, fares within GR. He argues that a causal theory of properties 
requires certain non-trivial topological conditions to hold, without which it cannot make sense of a plethora of 
spacetimes. There is a potential loophole in Lam’s analysis, namely “the extent to which the causal theory of 
properties is applicable to spatiotemporal (and gravitational) properties”, Lam (2009), p. 15 (translation, P.D.). 
Recall that we argued that spacetime as the network of (actual and possible) spatiotemporal relations  does not 
have properties. Whether an advocate of the causal theory of properties could simply extend the “causal 
disposition”, which previously he had envisaged for (intrinsic) properties only, upon relations as well, remains 
to be seen. 
135
 Curiel (2014b), p. 2. 
136
 Loc. cit., p. 3. 
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We will pursue some consequences of these results further in a subsequent paper137: In 
particular, we argue that the non-interactional nature of gravity will have some bearing on 
approaches to quantum gravity. Mainly, however, we will analyse the standard 
interpretation of binary systems whose increase in orbital frequency is commonly 
understood to reflect the emission of gravitational wave energy.  
 
6. Conclusion 
With our plea that spacetime, as represented by (ℳ,    , ∇), is best construed as the totality 
of spatiotemporal relations between events our position naturally appears to qualify as a 
form of relationism in that “bodies alone exhaust the domains of the intended models of 
[spacetime theories of the physical world]”138. Substantivalism, on the other hand, asserts 
that “both bodies and space are substances in that bodies and space points or regions are 
elements of the domains of the intended models of [space-time theories] of the physical 
world”139.    
Let’s by way of a summary compare our results with the tenets of “traditional relationalism”, 
which Earman characterizes by three “themes”: 140 
R1: “All motion is the relative motion of bodies.”141  
Remark: With the modification in meaning the term “motion” exacts in a general-relativistic 
setting we fully subscribe to this: Like in all geometrised spacetime theory, in GR the 
spatiotemporal behaviour of bodies is described four-dimensionally, expressed through 
paths (trajectories or curves). They represent the (actual or possible) spatiotemporal 
relations in which one event stands to another, both pertinent to (actual or possible) bodies. 
If “motion” is understood in this broader sense of trajectories, then all motion is ultimately 
the relative motion of bodies. Global rotation, as appears to realize Mach’s Newtonian 
Bucket Experiment, does not contradict this, for the concept of global rotation (and other 
forms of global “motion” such as a global expansion or shear) are defined via relative 
behaviour of (congruences of) geodesics, which in turn have (actual or hypothetical) test 
particles as their relata. 
R2: “Spatiotemporal relations among bodies and events are direct; that is, they are not 
parasitic on relations among a substratum of space points that underlie bodies or space-time 
points that underlie events.”142  
Remark: We fully subscribe to this theme, too. 
                                                          
137
 Cf. Duerr/Lehmkuhl (2015d) 
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 Earman (1989), p. 114 
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 Loc. cit.  
140
 Loc. cit., pp. 12 
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- Spacetime is indeed the totality of direct relations among events (represented by the 
manifold points). The non-existence of gravitational energy played a distinguished 
role here in our chain our arguments as a super-property: An entity that does not 
possess energy is not a material substance.  
- Note that Earman’s quoted definition does not specify, whether the relata of the 
spatiotemporal relations must be actual or possible bodies or events. We opted for 
Teller’s “liberalized” reading to include possible events as legitimate as well, whereas 
the majority of relationalists seem to have restricted the admissible domain to actual 
bodies or events.  
- Such relations are not ‘parasitic’ on relations between substantival spacetime points 
to the extent that a) firstly manifold points represent events; and the latter are not 
substances, but changes of the states in such b) secondly, we argued that as 
categories spatiotemporal relations are ontologically not reducible to substances and 
c) thirdly, we argued against an ontic reducibility of spacetime within (classical) GR.    
- By contradistinction, substantivalism regards spacetime as a “substance in that it 
forms a substratum that underlies physical events and processes, and spatiotemporal 
relations among such events and processes are parasitic on the spatiotemporal 
relations inherent in the substratum of space-time points and regions.”143 Recall that 
the technical term “substratum” amounts to the “ultimate subjecthood of 
predication” (Kuhlmann), i.e. being the carrier of properties. The ontological 
framework we adopted was based on such a substratum-type notion of substance. 
With the relational nature of spacetime, we explicitly embraced the consequence 
that it does not possess any properties: only its mathematical (ℳ,    , ∇) does. Tout 
court: We indeed deny substantivalism. 
R3: “No irreducible, monadic spatiotemporal properties like ‘is located at…’appear in a 
correct analysis of the spatiotemporal idiom.”144  
Remark: Again, we fully subscribe to this: With spacetime as a totality of relations, by our 
very definition there aren’t any “monadic spatiotemporal properties”. In fact, spacetime, we 
argued, has no properties at all. The statement the spacetime has vanishing curvature does 
not refer to a property of spacetime, but merely implicitly characterizes the metric structure 
by which it is partially represented as satisfying      [ ] ≡ 0; the metric structure, however, 
is a given structure on the differentiable manifold, the specific form of which is given by the 
Einstein Equations.   
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